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The objectives of this study are to investigate the factors and the extent level of expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights in context of Malaysia. Analysis of sixty companies listed from two industries in Bursa 
Malaysia was selected. Descriptive analysis and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model are 
performed in this study The variables tested are ownership concentration, firm size, board independence, 
profitability, level of leverage and firm growth. From these variables, only three variables can be concluded 
as factors influencing the expropriation of minority shareholders' rights in Malaysia. The number of 
independent outside directors increases the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders' rights. 
However, this relationship became opposite when the directors have a different characteristic among boards 
that affect their independence level. Profitability and growth are highly correlated. When the model is 
estimated using either one of them, the result is significantly negative, which means that profitable or growing 
firms have less incentives to engage in related party transactions. 
 




Companies might engage in related party transaction because it offers many returns to their company. One of 
the returns is acquiring and disposing of substantial assets among the related parties. Related party relationship 
exists when parties are considered to be related if one party has the ability to control the other party or exercise 
significant influence over the other party in making decision. Nevertheless, related party transactions are often 
viewed as being detrimental to outside shareholders. Officers, directors and large shareholders are well 
positioned to use their influence to enter into transactions that expropriate wealth from outside shareholders 
(Ryngaert, 2007). Even, the misalignment of goals and objectives frequently occurs between the majority and 
minority shareholders and not from the diverse interests of management and owners (Santiago and Brown, 
2007). Furthermore, the minority shareholders would be viewed as an unnecessary burden, an uninteresting 
weight by majority shareholders. This is not the first time minority shareholders have been in such a 
predicament. There have been many instances where they were not given a choice or a voice, over matters that 
could affect the value of their investments (The Edge Malaysia, 2009). 
 
In Malaysia, expropriation of minority shareholder’s right by majority shareholders often occur particularly in 
related party transaction, and nowadays, this issue is still debated in mass media. Thus, this study conducted to 
gain a deeper knowledge and understanding of the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights in Malaysia. 
This study tries to achieve these research objectives such as: to identify the extent level of expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ rights in Malaysia and to investigate the factors which are influencing expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ rights. 
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The structure of this paper will be as follows. Section 2 provides an explanation about the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the hypotheses development, variables measurement, data collection and analysis that are 
used in the study. Section 4 presents the results and findings from the study. The final section concludes the 
study.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
In emerging markets, minority shareholders have a role to play, whereby they can be a watchdog over the 
board's actions and help to create effective and well-governed companies. They also can be instrumental in the 
development and sustainability of capital markets as well. Shkolnikov (2006) states that expropriation of 
minority shareholders in Asia has been linked to the 1997 financial crisis. Expropriation is defined as the 
process of using one’s control power to maximize own welfare and redistribute wealth from minority 
shareholders to oneself. According to Santiago and Brown (2007), the expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
rights has been defined as the misalignment of interests between shareholder groups or substantial ownership 
of cash flow rights, leading to management insulation from external corporate control mechanisms without the 
necessary qualifications. Johnson et al. (2000), explored instances of expropriation of wealth by controlling 
shareholders from minority shareholders, among which are the transfers of assets to other companies under 
the majority shareholders control and the extraction of cash through dubious transactions.  
 
The expropriation of minority shareholders in the mid-1990s resulted in concentrated financial crisis in Asia 
and the limited ability of family owned firms in the Middle East and Latin America to attract investments 
have all underscored the importance of having minority shareholders as an oversight mechanism over legal 
infractions and an assurance tool for investors (Shkolnikov, 2006). According to Santiago and Brown (2007), 
two factors contribute to why minority shareholders are discouraged from investing among Latin American 
firms. First, controlling families are reluctant to trade companies’ shares since this may result in the dilution of 
power. Second, the weak legal environment gives rise to the potential for expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights. Usually, the issues of expropriation minority shareholders’ rights by majority 
shareholders often occur particularly in related party transaction. Therefore, related party transactions are 
often viewed as being detrimental to outside shareholders. Officers, directors and large shareholders are well 
positioned to use their influence to enter into transactions that expropriate wealth from outside shareholders 
(Ryngaert, 2007). These are evidenced by Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), which examined related party 
transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. The researchers show 
that related party transactions are associated with large losses in value for minority shareholders. 
 
The expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights will be analyzed using agency theory, whereby agency 
relationship arises when there is a contract where one party (the principal) engages another party (the agent) to 
perform some service on the principal’s behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency conflict arises due to 
corporate insiders have an incentive to pursue self-interests at the expense of corporate outsiders. In widely 
held firms, these conflicts exist between the managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In firms 
that are controlled by majority shareholders with large stakes, the interests of the firms’ controlling 
shareholders often clash with the firms’ minority shareholders. Given the dominance of concentrated cash 
flow and control rights in East Asia, the primary agency conflict for large corporations is that of restricting 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire 
building by unaccountable managers. According to Claessens, Djackov, Fan and Lang (1999), the scope for 
this conflict and the resulting expropriation depends on the wedge between cash flow and control rights. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Hypotheses Development  
3.1.1 Ownership Concentration 
 
According to Santiago and Brown (2007), the ownership structure, board size and CEO ownership are 
positively related with the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights.  However, Claessens et al. (1999) 
found that there is no significant evidence of expropriation for state control and control by widely held 
corporations.  
H1: Ownership concentration positively affected the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights.  
 
3.1.2 Firm Size  
 
Berkman et al. (2009) found that firms are less likely to engage in expropriation when they are smaller, which 
is consistent with hypothesis that larger firm is more likely to be the targets of expropriation. From a 
theoretical point of view, firm size is expected to be positively associated with an expropriation level (Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999).  
H2: There is a positive relationship between firm size and expropriation of minority shareholders’  
rights.  
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3.1.3 Level of Board Independence 
 
Cravens and Wallace (2001) found that the percentage of independent directors on the board and the size of 
the board have both been positively associated with levels of expropriation of minority shareholder (Janggi 
and Leung, 2004). However, a negative relationship found by Santiago and Brown (2007), between the 
measures of board independence and the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. The different 
characteristics of boards indirectly affect the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights.  





Berkman et al. (2009) expect a negative relation between profitability and expropriation. On the other hand, 
since more value can be expropriated in profitable firms, one might expect a positive relation between 
profitability and expropriation. Berkman et al. (2009) found that firms are less likely to engage in 
expropriation when they are more profitable and when they have better growth opportunities.  
H4: Profitability level is expected to have negative relationship in expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights.  
 
3.1.5 Level of Leverage 
  
The higher cost of external finance and default risk of highly leveraged firms implies that these firms are less 
likely to commit to high dividend payments. The inability to pay dividends by highly leveraged firms reduced 
the level of expropriation of minority shareholders' rights (Jensen, 1986). H5: There is a negative 
relationship between level of leverage and expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights.  
 
3.1.6 Firm Growth 
  
A study by Berkman et al. (2009) indicates that expropriation is more likely at firm with poor growth 
opportunities. The result from Akhtaruddin and Hossain (2008) also indicates that growth reduced 
expropriation activities. Due to this result, Akhtaruddin and Hossain (2008) summarized that a negative 
relation between growth opportunity and expropriation. Firm that has high growth opportunity is more likely 
to avoid the expropriation activities, especially towards minority shareholders’ rights compared to firms that 
have low growth opportunity. 
H6: Growth opportunity has negative relationship with expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable  
 
Measuring expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights as a dependent variable can be complicated given its 
several definitions. Thus, this study used related party transactions to represent expropriation of minority 
shareholders indirectly. Specifically, it follows Cheung et al. (2006) in identifying related party transactions 
that could amount to expropriation of minority shareholders. However, for this study, only Panel A is used as 
a proxy of transaction to measure expropriation indirectly than three panels that introduced by Cheung et al. 
(2006). This involves acquisitions of assets by the listed company from connected parties, asset sales by the 
listed firm to connected parties, sales of equity stakes in the listed company to connected parties, trading 
relationships between the listed firm and connected parties and direct cash payments or loan guarantees from 
the listed firm to a connected party. Information on these transactions is available in the section of notes to the 
accounts in firms’ annual reports. This study collected the monetary value of each transaction and calculated 
the total value of these transactions. Then, this total value divided with total sales for each firm.  
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
There are six independent variables in this study, i.e., ownership concentration, firm size, board independence, 
profitability, level of leverage and growth. 
i. Ownership Concentration - this study only concentrated on director ownership. Thus, director 
ownership was determined based on the percentage of share hold in the companies as at the end of 2009 
financial year.  
ii. Firm Size - the firm size was measured by the total assets of the company. 
iii. Board Independence - the proportion of independent board members is calculated from the number of 
independent directors divided by the number of commissioners' on the board.  
iv. Profitability - profitability is measured through the ratio of operating profit (EBITDA) to total assets.  
v. Level of Leverage - the leverage level is measured by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets as at 
the end of the 2009 financial year.  
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vi. Firm Growth - the growth is measured by market to book value (MTBV) of common shares. MTBV is 
defined as the ratio of market price per share to value of equity per share at financial year ended 2009.  
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
Sixty companies from two industries in the Bursa Malaysia: Industrial Product and Consumer Product are 
selected randomly as the sample. Thirty companies from each industry are drawn as samples. Annual reports 
of 2009 are chosen to extract the relevant information. Data is also gathered through the DataStream database 
where the information regarding the company’s financial data such as total sales, total assets, total liabilities 
and other information are obtained. Apart from annual reports and DataStream, other sources used were Bursa 
Malaysia websites, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) website, revised Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG), Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) and the database of the Commission 
of Companies Malaysia (CCM). To enhance data accuracy, data collected from one source was verified by 
reference to other sources whenever it is possible. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
3.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The first part is the analysis on describing the demographic and financial characteristics of the sample firms. 
Descriptive analysis is carried out using statistical package for the social science (SPSS). 
 
3.4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
To determine the connection between ownership concentration, firm size, board independence, profitability, 
level of leverage and firm growth, with expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights, the linear regression 
with robust standard errors was carried out to better characterize the associations among these variables. The 
linear regression with robust standard errors, using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model, it is often 
designed to generate estimators and other statistics in regression analysis. Statistics of Analysis Data (Stata) is 
used to run the OLS regression model. 
 
Thus, the OLS regression that is used in this study for testing the hypothesis is estimated as follows:   
RPT i  =  α  +  β1  (Ownership) i  +  β2  (Size) i   +  β3  (Independence) i 
+  β4  (Profitability) i +  β5  (Leverage) i  +  β6 ( Growth) i 
Where; 
RPT    = Proxy of expropriation of minority shareholders’ right in company i 
Ownership   = Percentage of directors ownership in company i 
Size    = Size of company i 
Independence    = Percentage of board independence in company i 
Profitability   = Profit of company i 
Leverage   = Level of leverage of company i 
Growth   = Growth of company i 
 
4. Results and Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 present the descriptive analysis of the variables. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample regarding to the variables namely: RPT, OWNERSHIP, SIZE, 
INDEPENDENCE, PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE and GROWTH. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Std. Deviation Min Max 
RPT 0.1704 0.3389 0.0035 1.8210 
OWNERSHIP 0.1768 0.2080 0.0000 0.8704 
SIZE 19.1080 1.1927 17.2000 22.9000 
INDEPENDENCE 0.4482 0.1352 0.2200 0.8300 
PROFITABILITY 0.0610 0.2006 -1.2125 0.4021 
LEVERAGE 0.4329 0.2244 0.0962 1.0601 
GROWTH 0.3765 2.4125 -16.8100 4.1600 
 
For a better comprehension, the Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample industries i.e. Industrial Product 
and Consumer Product for all variables. Result reported in the tables includes the mean, standard deviation, 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Industries Group 
 
  Industrial Product  Consumer Product  
  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
RPT 0.1106 0.2414 0.0035 1.2129 0.2302 0.4098 0.0039 1.8210 
OWNER-SHIP 0.1765 0.2301 0.0000 0.8704 0.1771 0.1873 0.0000 0.5231 
SIZE 19.1100 1.0814 17.2000 21.6000 19.1060 1.3133 17.2000 22.9000 
INDEPEND-ENCE 0.4610 0.1593 0.2200 0.8300 0.4353 0.1071 0.2500 0.7500 
PROFIT 0.0775 0.1197 -0.3153 0.4021 0.0446 0.2588 -1.2125 0.3280 
LEVERAGE 0.4740 0.2323 0.0962 1.0601 0.3917 0.2122 0.1023 1.0176 
GROWTH 0.5187 0.9119 -2.9400 2.3300 0.2343 3.3117 -16.810 4.1600 
 
The mean of RPT that acts as a proxy of expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights is 17.04 percent 
indicated in Table 1. Referring to Table 2, there is a small difference about 11.96 percent in means of RPT 
between both of industries. The Industrial Product Industry shows about 11.06 percent of the mean of RPT 
while the Consumer Product Industry shows a value of 23.02 percent.  
 
 4.2 OLS Regression Model 
[ 
The regression results for the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights and their factors are presented in 
Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, using one-tailed test.  
 
Table 3: Linear Regression Result 
 
RPT Coef. Robust Std. 
Error 
t P= value (one-
tailed test) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0758207 0.1458425 -0.52 0.3025 
SIZE 0.0098957 0.0388423 0.25 0.4000 
INDEPENDENCE 0.6360407 0.4888332 1.30 0.0995 * 
PROFITABILITY -0.3986084 0.3696569 -1.08 0.1430 
LEVERAGE -0.1551883 0.1494248 -1.04 0.1520 
GROWTH -0.0341292 0.0289298 -1.18 0.1215 
R-squared   =   0.1911 
*** significant at 1 percent 
  **   significant at 5 percent 
  *     significant at 10 percent 
  
 
Table 3 shows that the only significant coefficient is the INDEPENDENCE variable. The coefficient of the 
INDEPENDENCE is 0.636 with p < 0.10, showing that it is marginally significant since ‘p’ is close to 0.10.  
 
For further analysis, some adjustments have been made in the data used in this study. Since there are high 
percentage of correlation between PROFITABILITY and GROWTH, thus the next tests delete one of these 
two variables. By deleting these variables, the model is re-estimated and the new results are shown in Table 4 
and Table 5. 
Table 4: Linear Regression Result – Delete GROWTH 
 
RPT Coef. Robust Std. Error t P= value (one-tailed test) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0704470 0.1444654 -0.49 0.3140 
SIZE 0.0106846 0.0374845 0.29 0.3885 
INDEPENDENCE 0.6592813 0.4890636 1.35 0.0915 * 
PROFITABILITY -0.7583662 0.2485572 -3.05 0.0020 *** 
LEVERAGE -0.1529432 0.1510551 -1.01 0.1580 
R-squared   =   0.1767 
By deleting the GROWTH variable, the result as shown in Table 4, found that there are two significant 
relationships, which are between RPT with board INDEPENDENCE, the coefficient of which is 0.6592 with 
p < 0.10; and PROFITABILITY, with a coefficient of -0.7584 and p < 0.01. However, for INDEPENDENCE, 
it is marginally significant since ‘p’ is close to 0.10.  
 
Table 5: Linear Regression Result – Delete PROFITABILTY 
 
RPT Coef. Robust Std. Error t P= value (one-tailed test) 
OWNERSHIP -0.0841629 0.1464750 -0.57 0.2840 
SIZE 0.0015491 0.0402093 0.04 0.4845 
INDEPENDENCE 0.5579177 0.4862876 1.15 0.1280 
LEVERAGE -0.0939236 0.1280231 -0.73 0.2330 
GROWTH -0.0590844 0.0150627 -3.92 0.000 *** 
R-squared   =   0.1794 
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In Table 5, when the variable PROFITABILITY is removed from data, the result shows that the GROWTH 
variable is statistically significant. The coefficient of the GROWTH is -0.0591 and significant with p < 0.01. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The issue of related party transaction in Malaysia provides an interesting scenario to expand research on 
expropriation of minority shareholders' rights. Moreover, the issue about expropriation of minority 
shareholders right is still debated in mass media. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to empirically identify 
the extent level of expropriation and to examine the factors that affect expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
rights in Malaysia.  It can be concluded that the extent level of the expropriation of minority shareholders' 
rights in Malaysia is 17.04 percent of total sales, where there is a small difference about 11.96 percent 
between both of industries. Overall, the study found some evidence that related party transactions could 
influence expropriation of minority shareholders' rights. The finding suggests that earnings quality of a 
company would be worse if the companies engage in real expropriation activities, for example through certain 
types of related party transactions, such as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity sales, transactions that result 
from trading relationship and any transactions that involve cash payment made to the controlling owners. 
Thus, the Securities Commissions, active institutional investors and MSWG may have role to monitor such 
transactions from occurring in order to protect the interest of minority shareholders. 
 
The relationships could be highlight potential problem of expropriation when there is a high degree of 
ownership concentration, board independence and firm size, and also low level of profitability, leverage and 
growth. From six variables that tested only three variables can be concluded as factors that affect 
expropriation of minority shareholders' rights in Malaysia. They are board independence, profitability and 
growth. It appears that as the number of directors’ independence that serving on the board increase through 
the inclusion of additional independent outside directors, value of RPT is also increased. It is possible that this 
independent board of directors have approved through the RPT and assumed that these transactions would not 
neglect the interest of minority shareholders’ rights. In fact, it is possible during bad earnings, which it is the 
best interest of all shareholders to have higher level of RPT in order to cut costs and mobilize internal 
resources. The increases of profitability and growth opportunity also gave benefit to companies to reduce the 
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